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Konu : Deniz Haydutluğu – EUNAVFOR-CMF Tehdit Değerlendirmesi Raporu

Sirküler No: 1277

Sayın Üyemiz,

Uluslararası Deniz Ticaret Odası (International Chamber of Shipping–ICS) tarafından Odamıza gönderilen 1 Aralık 2021 tarih ve MC(21)105 sayılı yazıda, Avrupa Birliği Deniz Kuvvetleri ve Birleşik Deniz Kuvvetleri (European Naval Forces–EUNAVFOR and Combined Maritime Forces–CMF) tarafından yayımlanan "Tehdit Değerlendirmesi Raporu"na yer verilmektedir.

Detayları ve Türkçe tercümesi özeti Ek'te sunulan tehdit değerlendirme raporunda; bölgede deniz haydutluğu kaynaklı tehdidin düşük, çatışmalardan kaynaklı tehdit seviyesinin Suudi Koalisyonu ile bağlantılı gemilere yönelik orta, terör kaynaklı tehditlerin ise düşük seviyede olduğu belirtilmektedir.

Bölgedeki vakalara ilişkin detayları içeren bahse konu tehdit değerlendirmesinin, bilmesi gereken prensibi kapsamında paylaşılması gerektiği ifade edilmektedir.

Bilgilerinize arz/rica ederim.

Saygılarımla,

*e-imza*İsmet SALİHOĞLU
Genel Sekreter**Ek:**

- 1- Yayımlanabilir Tehdit Değerlendirmesi Özet Tercümesi (4 sayfa)
- 2- ICS Yazısı ve Tehdit Değerlendirmesi Bülteni (16 sayfa)

Dağıtım:

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- Türk Armatörler Birliği
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HİZMETE ÖZEL





DENİZ TİCARET ODASI CHAMBER OF SHIPPING



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HİZMETE ÖZEL



Sektörel Yayınlanabilir Tehdit Değerlendirmesi Özet Tercümesi

Ek-1

Yayınlanma Tarihi: 01 Aralık 2021

Bu Tehdit Değerlendirmesinin sınırlı yayımı ve dağıtımına izin verilmektedir.



Giriş

Bu Sektörel Yayınlanabilir Tehdit Değerlendirmesi (IRTA) Birleşik Deniz Kuvvetleri (CMF) ve Avrupa Birliği Deniz Kuvvetleri Somali (EU NAVFOR) tarafından oluşturulmuştur.

IRTA'nın amacı, Kızıldeniz, Bab al Mandeb Boğazı, Aden Körfezi ve Batı Hint Okyanusu'ndan geçen ticaret gemileri ve büyük balıkçı gemilerine yönelik tehditler hakkında sektörün bilgilendirilmesini sağlamaktır. 01 Eylül 2021 tarihinde yayımlanan tehdit değerlendirmesini güncellemektedir.

15 Ağustos 2021 ile 1 Aralık 2021 tarihli IRTA arasındaki dönemde, Sektörel Yayınlanabilir Tehdit Bülteni'nin (IRTB) yayımlanmasını gerektiren herhangi bir deniz olayı yaşanmamıştır

Yönetici Özeti

Kızıldeniz, Bab al Mendeb Boğazı, Aden Körfezi ve Batı Hint Okyanusu'ndan geçen ticaret gemileri ve büyük balıkçı gemilerine yönelik tehdit durumu aşağıdaki şekilde sınıflandırılmıştır.

a. Deniz Haydutluğu DÜŞÜK (saldırı OLASI OLMAYAN).

b. Çatışmayla ilgili olarak;

i. Suudi Arabistan Krallığı (SAK) ve Suudi liderliğindeki Koalisyon (SLK) bayraklı gemiler için ORTA, bir saldırı MÜMKÜN, ancak OLASILIĞI YÜKSEK DEĞİL.

ii. Diğer ülkeler için DÜŞÜK, bir saldırı OLASILIĞI DÜŞÜK.

c. Terör olasılığı DÜŞÜK (saldırı OLASILIĞI DÜŞÜK).

d. Dönem boyunca rapor edilecek Deniz Güvenliği Olayı kaydedilmemiştir.

Somali, Yemen ve Mozambik ile ilgili aşağıdaki bölümler, bölgedeki güvenlik durumunun değerlendirilmesini sağlamak için açık kaynak raporlamadan alınan özet bilgiler içermektedir.

Somali'deki Durum

Somali'deki seçimler, ülkedeki siyasi duruma hâlâ hakimdir. 08 Şubat 2021'de, Başkan Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed'in (Farmaajo olarak bilinen) görev süresi sona ermiştir. Eylül ayında Başkan Farmaajo ile Başbakan Mohamed Hussein Roble arasındaki siyasi sorun süreci daha da güçleştirmiştir. Şu anda her iki liderin de seçim sürecini hızlandırmak için farklılıklarını bir kenara bırakma konusunda anlaşığı görülmektedir. Mevcut durumda, Üst Meclis için seçim süreci tamamlanmış ve Alt Meclis'in seçim süreci devam etmektedir. Bununla birlikte, Somali Federal Hükümeti (SFH) henüz Cumhurbaşkanlığı Seçimi için onaylanmış bir tarih açıklamamıştır.

Harakat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujahideen (Al-Shabaab, AS) çoğunlukla başkent Mogadişu'da ve orta ve güneyde aktif kalırken, Somali'deki İslam Devleti, Puntland'ın kuzey bölgesinde aktif olmaya devam etmektedir. AS, Somali'de güvenlik ve istikrarın bozulmasına sebep olan kuruluştur ve denize erişimi kolaylaştırmak ve yasa dışı faaliyetlerde bulunmak için suç şebekeleriyle bağlantılarını sürdürmeye devam etmektedir. Bu erişim örgüt için önemlidir, çünkü örgüte terörist operasyonlarını finanse eden sürekli bir gelir akışı sağlamaktadır. Geçtiğimiz birkaç yıl içinde, Somali Güvenlik Güçleri, Somali'deki Afrika Birliği Misyonu (AMISOM) ve diğer uluslararası ortakların artan çabaları, AS'nin kontrolünde olan şehir ve bölgeleri geri alarak, önemli sayıda terör örgütü mensubunun etkisiz hale getirilmesini sağlamıştır.

Buna ilave olarak, siyasi istikrarsızlık ve uzun seçim süreci, AS'nin süreci olabildiğince bozmaya odaklanmasını sağlayan itici bir faktör olmuştur. En son terör saldırısı 2021 yılı Mart ayında Bosasso'nun Merkez Hapishanesine gerçekleştirilmiş olup, yaklaşık 400 mahkumun firarı ile sonuçlanmıştır.

Yine de AS, Somali'deki tek güvensizlik kaynağı değildir. Kronik toplumsal ve siyasi çatışmalar, Somali halkı için önemli bir istikrarsızlaştırıcı faktör olmaya devam etmektedir. Klan sistemi ve rakip klan milisleri siyaset, toplum ve ekonomi üzerinde belirgin bir etki faktörü olmaya devam etmektedir.

Yemen'deki Durum

Husi kuvvetleri, Yemen'in kuzeyinden Suudi askeri ve sivil altyapısını hedef almak için Balistik Füzeler (BM) ve patlayıcı yüklü İnsansız Hava Araçlarını (İHA'lar) kullanmaya devam etmektedir. Hem petrol zengini doğu bölgesine yapılan saldırı hem de Bab al Mendeb'in hemen kuzeyindeki Mokha limanına yapılan saldırı, bölgedeki deniz taşımacılığı için risk teşkil etmektedir. Denizde patlayıcı yüklü İnsansız Suüstü Aracı (İSA'lar) tarafından bildirilen herhangi bir saldırı olmamıştır. Bununla birlikte, Husilerin böyle bir saldırı gerçekleştirme kapasitesi hala mevcut olmakla birlikte, yanlış tanımlama veya dolaylı hasar teşkil etmesi açısından ticaret gemilerine yönelik risk devam etmektedir. İSA'lar da dahil olmak üzere küçük teknelerin kullanılması muson geçiş dönemlerinde daha olasıdır.

Bu yıl Şubat'ta Orta Yemen'deki Marib şehrine yönelik başlatılan önemli kara hareketi devam etmektedir. Eylül ayının ilk iki haftasında, Husi güçleri Marib Şehri'nin güneyindeki kara hareketinin yeni bir aşamasını başlatmıştır. Al Bayda ve Shabwa valiliklerinde bazı kazanımlar elde edilmiştir. Husilerin Suudi Arabistan Koalisyonu hava saldırıları nedeniyle çok sayıda (birkaç yüz) kayıp verdiğine dair haberler verilmektedir. Bu yeni aşama için, muhtemelen diğer cephelerden diğer Husi birlikleri harekete geçirilmiştir. Husilerin ana hedefi, muhtemelen Kuzey Yemen'in ve petrol ve gaz altyapısının kontrolünü kendilerine verecek olan Marib vilayetini ele geçirmektir.

Temel gıda kıtlığı göstergeleri, fiyatların keskin bir şekilde artmasıyla yaygınlaşmıştır. Terör örgütlerinin çatışmaya karıştığına dair göstergeler de gün yüzüne çıkmıştır. Yerinden edilmiş birçok insan Marib vilayetinde yerleşmiştir (130 kampta yaklaşık 1,5 milyon yerinden edilmiş insan bulunmaktadır). Çatışma kamplara yaklaştıkça insani kriz daha da şiddetlenebilecektir. Barış süreci çıkmaza girmiştir. Bu durum uluslararası toplum ve bölgesel aktörlerin 6 yıllık iç savaşı sona erdirmek için girişimlerine rağmen Husi güçleri önerilen tüm planları reddetmiştir.

Mozambik'teki Durum

Belirgin iyileşme belirtileri gösterse de, kuzey Mozambik'teki 2017 isyanının ardından güvenlik durumu istikrarsız olmaya devam ediyor. İlk saldırısını 2017 yılında kuzeydeki Cabo Delgado eyaletinde başlatan ve yerel olarak Al-Shabaab (Somali'deki Al-Shabaab ile ilgisi olmayan) olarak tanımlanan Ansar al-Sunna (AaS) veya yerel olarak bilinen terörist grup, hala direniş ceplerini korumaktadır.. Bununla birlikte, Temmuz'dan itibaren Mozambik ve Ruanda Kuvvetleri tarafından ortaklaşa yürütülen bir askeri operasyon, tehdidi bastırmada ve daha önce ellerinde tuttıkları kilit şehirlerden Ansar al-Sunna'yı geri almalarına vesile olmuştur.

Bu koalisyon zaferi, terörizme karşı savaşın yavaş yavaş kazanıldığına ve geçmişte yaşanan olayların isyan bastırma operasyonlarının ilk aşamasının sonunu işaret ettiğine dair umutları artırmıştır. Aynı zamanda, bu başarı, terör eylemlerini kuzeye, Ekim'de ilk terör saldırılarının bildirildiği Tanzanya'nın güneyine taşımaktadır.

Değerlendirme

Genel

Somali sahili boyunca seyir ile ilgili riskler hala sürmektedir. Bölgede halihazırda deniz haydutları çeteleri bulunmakta ve denizde eylem yapma kabiliyetlerini korudukları değerlendirilmektedir. Yasadışı gruplar, deniz haydutları saldırıları gerçekleştirmenin getirilerinin risklerden daha ağır bastığını değerlendirirse, bu grupların saldırılarına devam etmesi muhtemeldir.

Başarılı bir saldırı, daha fazla saldırıyı teşvik edebilir ve bu nedenle, En İyi Yönetim Uygulamaları Rehberi'nde (BMP5) önerilen önlemleri uygulamak son derece önemlidir. Son 2 yılda saldırı olmadığı için riskler göz ardı edilmemelidir.

Deniz Haydutluğu DÜŞÜK (saldırı OLASILIĞI DÜŞÜK).

Deniz haydutluğu faaliyetlerinin mevcut durum itibarıyla engellendiği (ancak ortadan kaldırılmadığı) değerlendirilmektedir:

- a. BMP5'in yaygın olarak uygulanması (Kızıldeniz, Aden Körfezi, Hint Okyanusu ve Arap Denizi'nde Deniz Haydutluğunu Önlemek ve Deniz Güvenliğini Geliştirmek için En İyi Yönetim Uygulamaları – 18 Haziran'da yayınlanan Sürüm 5),
- b. Gemilerde Sözleşmeli Silahlı Özel Güvenlik Personeli (PCASP) bulundurulması,
- c. Bölgede CMF, EU NAVFOR, diğer savaş gemileri ve deniz karakol uçakları tarafından gerçekleştirilen karakol ve izleme operasyonları,
- d. Deniz Haydutluğu için hapis cezası getirilmesi,
- e. Eski deniz haydutları tarafından gerçekleştirilen kaçakçılık gibi daha düşük riskli, ancak kârlı suç faaliyetlerinin benimsenmesi,
- f. Somali Sahil Güvenlik Güçleri gibi Somali deniz güvenlik güçlerinin yetenek ve yeterliliklerinde iyileştirmeler deniz haydutluğu faaliyetlerinin azalmasını sağlamıştır.

Bununla birlikte, Somali'de deniz haydutluğunun nedensel faktörleri devam etmektedir. Bu faktörler arasında, bunlarla sınırlı olmamakla birlikte; yoksulluk, işsizlik, seçimlerde sorunlar, yolsuzluk, çatışma, yasadışı balıkçılık ve aşırı avlanma yer almaktadır.

Aşağıdaki koşulların bazıları veya tümü karşılanırsa deniz haydutluğunun yeniden ortaya çıkması;

- a. Denizcilik sektörünün BMP5'i uygulamayı bırakması veya gemilerde Sözleşmeli Özel Silahlı Güvenlik Personeli bulundurulmasının bırakılması,
- b. Bölgedeki savaş gemileri ve yerel deniz güvenlik güçlerinin mevcudiyetinde önemli bir azalma olması,
- c. Güvenlik, ekonomik ve siyasi durumdaki bozulma, COVID-19 salgını, kıtlık, kuraklık, sel ve çekirge istilası nedeniyle yoksulluktaki artış,
- d. Yerel denizcilik kolluk kuvvetleri, liman tesislerini ve yakındaki kıyı alanlarını korumakla sınırlı kalması,
- e. Uluslararası denizcilik kuruluşları arasında işbirliği eksikliği,
- f. Bilgi paylaşımı ve raporlama eksikliği,
- g. Somali Güvenlik Hizmetlerinin, uluslararası toplumdan yetersiz destek ve rehberlik alması koşullarına bağlı olarak olumsuz gelişme gösterebilecektir.



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1 December 2021

MC(21)105

TO: MARINE COMMITTEE

Copy: All Full and Associate Members (for information)

EUNAVFOR CMF INDUSTRY RELEASABLE THREAT ASSESSMENT

Action Required: Members are invited to note the Industry Releasable Threat Assessment provided at Annex A.

Members are invited to note the Industry Releasable Threat Assessment (IRTA) developed by EUNAVFOR and CMF, provided at **Annex A**. The assessment determines that the threat from piracy is low; conflict related threats are low to moderate depending on whether a ship is associated with the Saudi-led Coalition; and that the threat from terrorism is low. It will be recalled that the BMP Co-Authors are currently developing a new mechanism to provide threat assessments to the industry, and the IRTA will likely form part of that process.

Any questions relating to the information provided should be directed to the undersigned (john.stawpert@ics-shipping.org).

John Stawpert
Senior Manager (Environment and Trade)

Industry Releasable Threat Assessment



Issued on 01 Dec 2021
ICOD 15 Nov 2021



This Threat Assessment has been released to the maritime community in confidence. It should not be disseminated further without permission.



Introduction

1. The Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) and the European Union Naval Force Somalia (EU NAVFOR) have jointly written this Industry Releasable Threat Assessment (IRTA).
2. The purpose of the IRTA is to articulate the threat to merchant and large fishing vessels transiting the Red Sea, Bab al Mandeb Strait (BAM), Gulf of Aden (GOA) and the Western Indian Ocean. It updates the previous IRTA released on 01 Sep 21, which had an Intelligence Cut-off Date (ICOD) of 15 Aug 21.

3. In the period between 15 Aug 21 and this IRTA's ICOD, there have been no maritime incidents that merited the release of an Industry Releasable Threat Bulletin (IRTB) (a decrease of two IRTBs has been observed since the previous reporting period 15 May-15 Aug).

Executive Summary

4. The threat to merchant and large fishing vessels transiting the Red Sea, BAM, GOA and the Western Indian Ocean is classified as follows:

- a. Piracy is LOW (an attack is UNLIKELY).
- b. Conflict-related activity
 - i. MODERATE for Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Saudi-led Coalition (SLC)-flagged vessels, an attack is POSSIBLE but UNLIKELY.
 - ii. LOW for other countries, an attack is UNLIKELY.
- c. Terrorism is LOW (an attack is UNLIKELY).
- d. No Maritime Security Events to report during the period.

5. The following sections on Somalia, Yemen and Mozambique contain summary information, drawn from open source reporting, in order to provide an appreciation of the security situation in the region.

Situation in Somalia

6. The elections in Somalia still dominate the political situation in the country. On 08 Feb 21, the term of President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed (also known as Farmaajo) expired, since then the election process has been marred by a myriad of issues; such as delays emanating from the lack of timely, administrative and logistical procedures. To exacerbate matters, a political rift between President Farmaajo and Prime Minister Mohamed Hussein Roble in September further derailed the process. Currently it appears that, both leaders have agreed to put their differences aside in order to expedite the electoral process. As things stand, the electoral process for the Upper House has been concluded and that of the Lower House is ongoing. Nevertheless, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) is yet to announce a confirmed date for the Presidential Election.

7. The Islamic State in Somalia (IS-S) continues to remain active in the northern region of Puntland, whilst Harakat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujahideen (Al-Shabaab, AS) remains mostly active in the capital, Mogadishu, and the central and southern regions of the country. For some time, AS has been the primary contributor towards the degradation of security and stability in Somalia and continues to persist in maintaining links to criminal networks in order to facilitate access to the sea and carry out illicit activities. This access is important for the organisation, because it provides it with a constant stream of revenue which funds their terrorist operations. Over the past few years, an increased endeavour from the Somali Security Forces, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and other international partners has resulted in neutralising a significant number of the

terrorist group's commanders and retaking cities and areas that were previously under the control of AS. AS is still to be considered to possess the capability to carry out daily attacks with relative ease on land. Additionally, the political instability and lengthy electoral process have been a driving factor for AS to remain focused on disrupting the process as much as possible. The latest complex terrorist attack took place in Mar 21, when Bosasso's Central Prison was successfully attacked, resulting in the escape of approximately 400 prisoners.

8. Nevertheless, AS is not the only source of insecurity in Somalia. Chronic communal and political conflict remains a major destabilising factor for the Somali people. The Somali political and security arena is strongly influenced by a wider range of variables and actors who use violence as a means to an end. The clan system and rival clan militias remain a salient influencing factor on politics, society and economy.

Situation in Yemen

9. During this reporting period, Houthi forces continued to use Ballistic Missiles (BM) and explosive-laden Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to target Saudi military and civilian infrastructure from the North of Yemen. Both the attack on the oil-rich eastern region and the attack on port of Mokha, just north of the BAM, pose a risk of collateral damage to shipping in the region. There have been no reported attacks at sea by explosive-laden Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USVs) during this reporting period. However, the Houthi capacity for this still exists and this still poses a risk to civilian shipping through misidentification or collateral damage. The use of small craft, including USVs, is more likely in the monsoon transition periods.

10. The significant ground offensive against the city of Marib in Central Yemen, initiated in Feb this year continues. In the first fortnight of September, Houthi forces have initiated a new phase of their ground campaign, south of Marib City. They have achieved some gains in the Al Bayda and Shabwa governorates. There are reports that the Houthi suffered a large number of casualties (several hundred) because of SLC airstrikes. For this new phase, other Houthis troops were probably mobilized from other fronts. The Houthis main priority is likely to take the Marib governorate, which would give them control of Northern Yemen and the oil and gas infrastructure.

11. Indicators of food staple shortages are now commonplace, with prices rising sharply. Indicators that terrorist organizations are becoming involved in the conflict have also surfaced. Many displaced people are located in the Marib governorate (around 1.5 million displaced people are located in 130 camps). The humanitarian crisis could be exacerbated as the fighting draws closer to the camps.

12. The peace process is at a stalemate. This is in spite of different diplomatic initiatives by the international community and regional actors to end the six years' civil war, permitting aid delivery to the population affected by the conflict. The Houthi forces have so far rejected all the proposed plans.

Situation in Mozambique

13. Although showing signs of marked improvement, the security situation following the 2017 insurgency in northern Mozambique remains unstable. The terrorist group identified as Ansar al-Sunna (AaS) or locally known as Al-Shabaab (not related to Al-Shabaab in Somalia) who had launched their first attack in the northern province of Cabo Delgado in 2017, still maintain pockets of resistance in the northern Mozambican provinces. However, a concerted military effort by Mozambican and Rwandan Forces from Jul 21 onwards have proved successful in subduing the threat and removing AaS from key towns that they had previously held.

14. This coalition victory raised hopes that the war against terrorism is being slowly won and that past events have marked the end of the first phase of counter insurgency operations. At the same time, this success is moving terrorist actions northwards, to the south of Tanzania, where the first terrorist attacks have been reported in Oct 21.

Significant events 16 Aug 21 to 15 Nov 21

Piracy

15. There have been no incidents of piracy during the reporting period, although it is not unusual for Motor Vessels (MV) to initially report suspicious approaches by skiffs as possible pirate attempts. The last confirmed, yet unsuccessful, pirate attacks were conducted in the Somali Basin against the Fishing Vessel (FV) ADRIA (South Korea flag) and the FV TXORI ARG1 (Spain flag) on 19 Apr 19.

Conflict Related

16. There have been no conflict related incidents during the reporting period. The last confirmed conflict related incident was the explosion in Motor Tanker (MT) BW RHINE (Singapore flag) on 13 Dec 20.

Terrorism

17. No terrorism incidents in the maritime domain have been reported during the reporting period.

Maritime Crime

18. No maritime crime incidents in the maritime domain have been reported during the period.

Maritime Security Events – Suspicious Activity

19. No suspicious activity in the maritime domain has been reported during the period.

Non-Maritime Security Events

20. **18 Sep 21. Bulk carrier MODIGLIANI** (IMO: 9615406, Liberia flagged) reported that one white hulled skiff with outboard motors and 9 persons on board (POB), approached directly towards the vessel with a Closest Point of Approach (CPA) of 0.1 ~ 0.2NM in posn. 13.08N – 043.06E. Ladders and drums were observed on the boat.

Weapons were not confirmed. The skiff diverted the course and moved away towards the Yemen coast after the Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP) showed weapons. The crews and MV were reported safe.

21. **25 Sep 21. Oil tanker BATTERSEA PARK** (IMO: 9255983, Liberia flagged) reported that a drone (1.5m with 2 aero foils) approached with a CPA of approximately 400m then moved away towards Hudaydah, Yemen in posn. 14.64N – 042.09E. At the same time the MV also observed two dark hulled skiffs with sunshades with 8 POB on each with a CPA of 2NM. The MV followed security protocols, they conducted evasive manoeuvres and the crew proceeded to citadel, whilst the master and PCASP remained on the bridge. The MV continued on its voyage. The crew and vessel were reported as safe.

22. **28 Sep 21. Container Carrier CMA CGM KAILAS** (IMO: 9339545, Panama flagged) reported a suspicious vessel at a distance of approximately 2 ~ 3NM in posn. 01.26N – 051.52E. MV stated that she altered her course and increased speed IAW BMP5, however the suspicious vessel (described as red hulled and having a big crane in the centre) also increased speed and changed her course to match that of MV. The suspicious vessel continued to follow at a distance of 2 ~ 3NM for approximately 1 hour and 30 minutes. When MV increased its speed to 18kts the suspicious vessel changed direction and sailed away. The crew and vessel were reported as safe.

23. **04 Oct 21. Oil tanker KHK EMPRESS** (IMO: 9830965, Singapore flagged) reported a skiff with 8 ~ 9 POB approaching in posn. 13.06N – 43.07E whilst conducting a Northbound BAM transit. The skiff closed the MV with an initial CPA of 0.1NM on the ships stern. At about 0.6NM on seeing the PCASP, the skiff altered their course passing approximately 0.5NM from the stem of the MV. No weapons, ladder or hooks were sighted. The crew and vessel were reported as safe.

24. **13 Oct 21. LNG tanker HOEGH GANNET** (IMO: 9822451, Singapore flagged) reported two drones (white bright lights) at an altitude of 100m and later another two flying objects (flashing green and red) in posn. 24.08N – 060.34E. The latter were reported as being at a higher altitude than the drones. The MV also reported that the drones were following the ship for approximately 1 hour 20 minutes. The crew and vessel were reported as safe.

25. **16 Oct 21. Oil tanker ESSIE C** (IMO: 9702211, Marshall Islands flagged) reported fishing vessel on her starboard side at a distance of 3.2NM then altered its course to portside in posn. 00.47N – 055.49E, reducing the CPA to 1NM. The fishing vessel was not showing on Automatic Identification System (AIS) and contacted on CH16 no reply was given. When the fishing vessel got closer the MV noticed a black skiff (black hull and orange top) with 2 ~ 3 POB approaching. The MV increased speed and passed clear of both the fishing vessel and the skiff. Later the fishing vessel showed up on AIS as FV DRENNEC (IMO: 9359703, French flagged). The Master mentioned that there was no connection between the fishing vessel and the skiff. No weapon were observed. The crew and vessel were reported as safe.

26. **19 Oct 21. Bulk carrier LOWLANDS SERENITY** (IMO: 9581758, Panama flagged) reported one suspicious skiff with six POB closing the MV with a CPA of 50 meters in posn. 12.42N – 043.16E. Ladders were observed, but no aggressive actions by the skiff and no weapon were observed. When the PCASP showed their weapons, the skiff diverted the course. The crew and vessel were reported as safe.

27. **28 Oct 21. Container ship OTELLO** (IMO: 9299628, French flagged) reported four suspicious skiffs with a total of 20 POB in posn. 12.30N 043.31E. Two of the skiffs were reported as closing the MV with a CPA of 0.5NM. After the MV increased its speed two of the skiffs crossed astern at a distance of 2 ~ 3NM. The other two skiffs were reported as moving on a steady course south-east. No tripwires were identified or reported by the MV. The MV did not have a PCASP on board. The crew and vessel were reported as safe.



Figure 1: Non-Maritime Security Events (01 SEP to 15 NOV 21)

Assessment

General

28. There are still risks associated with navigation in the vicinity of the Somali Coast. This is because of the poor security situation ashore and illicit activities in the Somali littoral. Previous piracy kingpins and gangs remain in the area and it is assessed that they retain the capability to conduct actions at sea. If illicit groups assess that the rewards of conducting piracy attacks outweigh the risks, then these groups will likely resume pirate attacks.

29. Any successful attack might encourage further attacks and therefore, it is of the utmost importance to implement the measures recommended in BMP5. There is a risk of complacency because there have been no attacks in the last 2 years.

Piracy – LOW (an attack is UNLIKELY)

30. It is assessed that Piracy is currently DETERRED / SUPPRESSED (but not eradicated) due to:

- a. The widespread implementation of BMP5 (Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy and Enhance Maritime Security in the Red Sea, GOA, Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea – Version 5 published Jun 18);
- b. The embarkation of PCASP;
- c. The continued presence, monitoring and deterrence operations performed by CMF, EU NAVFOR, other warships and maritime patrol aircraft in the area;
- d. The prospect of a prison sentence for pirates;
- e. The adoption of lower risk, yet profitable, criminal activities such as, smuggling undertaken by former pirates;
- f. Improvements in the capabilities and competence of Somali maritime security forces, such as the Somaliland Coast Guard.

31. However, the causal factors of piracy persist in Somalia. These factors include, but are not limited to, poverty, unemployment, the lack of effective governance, a stalemate in the elections, corruption, conflict, Illegal Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing and over-fishing.

32. Moreover, it is assessed that criminal / piracy networks retain the capability to seize opportunities and mount attacks with little to no notice, albeit at the cost of in-depth planning.

33. It is possible that piracy could resurface if some, or all of the following conditions are met:

- a. The shipping industry ceases to fully implement BMP5 or embark PCASP following a risk assessment;
- b. There is a significant decrease in the presence of warships and local maritime security forces in the area;
- c. The deterioration in the security, economic and political situation persists coupled with, the increase in poverty due to the recent COVID-19 pandemic, famine, droughts, floods and locust infestations;
- d. Local maritime law enforcement, remains limited to protecting port facilities and the immediate littoral areas;
- e. The lack of cooperation between international entities safeguarding the seas;
- f. The lack of bridge-to-bridge information sharing and reporting;
- g. Somalia's Security Services receive insufficient support and guidance from the international community.

Conflict Related – LOW to MODERATE (an attack is possible but unlikely)

34. It is assessed that the Houthis are HIGHLY UNLIKELY to agree to any proposed ceasefire arrangements while negotiating from a position of power. It is HIGHLY LIKELY that the conflict in Yemen will continue during the next reporting period, thus Houthi forces will HIGHLY LIKELY still have the intention to attack SLC related interests.

35. Therefore, the threat to KSA or SLC flagged vessels transiting the Red Sea, BAM and GOA remains MODERATE. However, it is assessed that such a threat is LOW for any vessels operating under another flag.

36. There is a REALISTIC POSSIBILITY that SLC tankers and warships in coastal waters south of Jeddah could be attacked by Houthi missiles or unmanned surface vessels or water-borne improvised explosive devices (WBIED). Furthermore, SLC flagged tankers in the GOA Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) could be attacked by explosive skiffs or by skiffs with small arms. MVs not associated with nations involved in the regional conflict are UNLIKELY to be attacked, although there is always a risk that vessels might be misidentified by combatants or suffer as a result of collateral damage.

37. While in the past Houthi forces have ALMOST CERTAINLY deployed naval mines in Yemeni coastal waters, such mines are LIKELY of low quality and are HIGHLY UNLIKELY to drift into international shipping lanes. Therefore, the threat from mines in international waters including the Maritime Security Transit Corridor (MSTC) continues to be LOW.

Terrorism – LOW (an attack is unlikely)

38. Conflicts in Somalia and Yemen continue to provide operating bases and freedom of manoeuvre for regional terrorist organizations such as AS, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Islamic State (IS) in Yemen, Somalia and Mozambique.

39. CMF and EU NAVFOR have agreed to maintain the assessed threat from terrorism as LOW.

Operations / Maritime Security Centre (Horn of Africa) Analysis

40. The announced 2-step process initiated by the Shipping Industry on High Risk Area (HRA) and also on a new concept regarding risk and threat has led to the reduction of the HRA on 01 Sep. Consequently, EU NAVFOR started studying the impact of that reduction on the use of PCASP on board, registrations to MSCHOA Voluntary Reporting Scheme (VRS) and potential changes in routes. Although three months might not be long enough to draw consistent conclusions, data reveals that at this moment there is not any significant change in the use of PCASP (See Fig.2). With regards to registration, no significant changes have been observed either, but, on the contrary, shipping traffic route across the Somali Basin, North to South and vice versa, is getting closer to Somali Coast in an apparent trend to concentrate along the edge of the new HRA (See Fig. 3).






Figure 2: Declared use of PCAS last 12 months¹



TRAFFIC SEP-OCT 2020



TRAFFIC SEP-OCT 2021

Figure 3: Shipping traffic behaviour after HRA reduction

41. EU NAVFOR will continue to analyse the impact of the reduction of the HRA boundaries in the coming months and will report its final conclusions appropriately.
42. CMF and EU NAVFOR strongly encourage MVs to register with MSCHOA before entering the Vessel Registration Area (VRA) (as indicated in Maritime Security Chart Q6099) and to implement protection measures as contained in BMP5. This will allow EU NAVFOR to allocate risk profiles to vessels transiting the area, permit efficient use of naval assets, as well as achieving a full understanding of traffic behaviour and BMP compliance.
43. Additionally, it is kindly reminded that the immediate reporting of incidents to MSCHOA, UKMTO and IMB will allow a faster and more efficient response by our naval assets patrolling the region.

¹ Data refers to vessels registered with MSCHOA VRS and transiting across the HRA. If we refer data on the use of PCAST to the whole VRA, figures for Oct would be around 28%.

CMF activity

44. As the region continues to grapple with the effects of the COVID 19 pandemic, CMF's engagement with regional partners and international organizations continues unabated to promote regional maritime security and provide assurance to the international maritime industry. With the improvement in the COVID situation in Middle East region, countries have started to ease their travel restrictions and facilitated more in-person conferences. Of note, CMF participated in the main planning conference for International Maritime Exercise (IMX) 2022 during the reporting period.

a. On 16 - 19 Aug 21, representatives CMF met with planners from 23 participating partner nations and shipping industry representatives in person, with several more joining virtually, in Manama to discuss IMX 2022 planned for execution from 30 Jan - 17 Feb 22.

b. IMX 22 is designed to demonstrate global resolve to maintain freedom of navigation and the free flow of commerce throughout the region's diverse maritime environment, and to build interoperability between partner nations and international organizations.

45. During this reporting period, CTF 150 commanded by New Zealand achieved six successful narcotics seizures totalling 8,391kg of Hash, 397.8kg of Heroin, 689.6kg of Meth and 10kg of contraband medicine. A Focused Operation (FO) was held over October and November with support from across CMF, CTF 465 (EU NAVFOR) and independently deployed assets across the region.

46. Although there have been no incidents of piracy off the Horn of Africa reported during the reporting period, piracy is suppressed but not eradicated. CTF 151 executed a FO in Oct 21 to show naval presence; reassure the merchant shipping and fishing communities; improve understanding of local patterns of life; inform the merchant industry risk management process; and support the overall counter-piracy campaign to reduce the piracy threat and deter suspected pirates from re-commencing their operations.

47. This FO was supported by eleven nations, involving ships, fixed-wing aircrafts and four different Maritime Organizations. Regional partners, such as the Djibouti Coast Guard, Royal Navy of Oman, Yemen Coast Guard, and Pakistan Navy, had participated in the operation. This demonstrated the cooperation and collaboration within the CMF area of responsibility for active and permanent deterrence and suppression of piracy. This FO had a complementary objective to encourage the maritime community not to underestimate the piracy threat in the region and to continue to comply with BMP5 and to utilize the IRTC, especially after the reduction of the HRA, effective since 01 Sep 21.

48. During the reporting period, both CTF 151 and CTF 465 units conducted coordinated operations at sea to further enhance interoperability and the combined efforts to counter-piracy. The Brazilian-led CTF 151 will continue to conduct counter piracy operations in their Area of Responsibility (AOR), whilst preparing their handover to the Jordan Navy on 18 Nov 21.

49. Furthermore, during the reporting period command of CTF 152 transitioned from the Saudi Arabian Border Guards (SABG) to the Kuwait Navy on 02 Sep 21. During the SABG-led command, CTF 152 conducted nine Joint Patrols and two FOs, which involved several regional coalition partners. CTF 152 will continue to conduct maritime operations

with the regional GCC nations (eight planned) including one escort exercise involving all regional partners, TF55 and UKMCC. All CMF Task Forces continue to observe patterns of life in the region, share information with coalition and international partners, and observe varying levels of illicit or suspicious activity.

EU NAVFOR activity

50. EU NAVFOR has continued to operate in the Gulf of Aden and in the Somali Basin preventing, deterring and continuously suppressing piracy whilst protecting World Food Program (WFP) ships and vulnerable vessels. Indeed, Somali based piracy is actively prevented deterred and countered by EU NAVFOR's and CMF active and reassuring posture across the AOO.

51. EU NAVFOR has continued to monitor vulnerable vessels transiting / operating in the area, with a specific focus on protecting those chartered by the WFP to provide aids into the region. In this light, EU NAVFOR has continued to provide our own military team permanently embarked, as an autonomous vessel protection detachment (AVPD), on board the merchant vessel time-chartered by the World Food Programme (WFP) to tranship aid from the regional food hubs into the Somali ports, thus predominantly operating in the coastal area of Somalia.

52. EU NAVFOR continues to conduct multiple FOs specifically oriented towards the causal factors of piracy. Piracy derives from interrelated features and circumstances of specific areas, such as the presence of criminal networks associated with piracy, fishing activities conducted by a variety of illegal and illicit actors and the presence of localised maritime law enforcement actors.

53. Throughout the whole period, numerous flights from the EU NAVFOR air assets have taken place. These flights covered both the high seas and the whole coast of Somalia, with the aim of enhancing the overall situational awareness, comprising the littorals, and providing indicators of a possible resurgence of pirate activity.

54. EU NAVFOR is continuously adapting procedures to contribute to suppressing piracy and increasing maritime security in a safe and effective manor during the COVID-19 pandemic.

55. The 11th Industry Strategic Meeting was hosted by EU NAVFOR's Operation Commander at the International Chamber of Shipping HQ on 09 Nov 21, in person for the first time after the pandemic outbreak. The meeting was attended by ICS, BIMCO, INTERTANKO, OCIMF, ECSA, IMB and also by CMF, AGENOR, NATO Shipping Centre and representatives from the Royal Navy. The meeting is assessed as a complete success and EU NAVFOR provided last threat assessment and initial conclusions derived from the ongoing study on the impact of the HRA reduction.

Conclusion

56. The regional threat of piracy in the Horn of Africa continues to be a strategic priority for EU NAVFOR. The combined effort of the naval forces deployed in the area and the continued support of the maritime industry to eradicate the threat has until now, been successful. In addition to this, the increasing cooperation efforts between the different entities and the correct application of the BMP5 procedures have contributed to guaranteeing maritime safety in the area of operations. The change of environmental

conditions from the South West Monsoon (SWM) to the Inter Monsoon Period (IMP) during this period of reporting will bring about better sea conditions in the region, especially in the Somali Basin. These favourable weather conditions will increase small boat activities in the area.

57. The ongoing conflict in Yemen continues to pose a LOW threat to shipping in the BAM, GOA and the Red Sea. For SLC and KSA flagged or associated vessels, the threat remains at MODERATE. There is still a risk that vessels not directly linked to the SLC could be misidentified and attacked when alongside in a KSA or SLC port, although it is assessed as UNLIKELY that Houthi forces will deliberately target them. Consequently, both CMF and EU NAVFOR have agreed upon an assessed LOW conflict-related threat to merchant shipping not directly linked to the SLC. There is no significant change from the assessment in the last IRTA.

58. The threat to shipping from terrorism remains LOW. An attack is unlikely, except against vessels of specific interest, related to local tensions.

59. Masters, operators and owners of merchant vessels are encouraged to continue to report all incidents and suspicious activity to UKMTO and MSCHOA at their earliest convenience². When reporting, it is requested that reports are accurate and comprehensive, providing as much evidentiary information as possible e.g. event logs, photographs, video, radar information and physical samples.

Annexes to this IRTA:

A. Glossary of Terms, Abbreviations and Acronyms.

² <https://eunavfor.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/BMP5-PP.pdf> p. 23.

Glossary of Terms, Abbreviations and Acronyms

AaS	Ansar al-Sunna
AGENOR	European Maritime Awareness Operation in the Strait of Hormuz
AIS	Automatic Identification System
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AOO	Area of Operation
AOR	Area of Responsibility
AQAP	Al Qaeda Arabian Peninsula
AS	Al Shabaab: Terrorist group operating in Somalia
AVPD	Autonomous Vessel Protection Detachment (military detachment)
BAM	Bab-al-Mandeb strait
BIMCO	Baltic and International Maritime Council
BMP 5	Best Management Practice (Version 5): IMO and industry sponsored suggested planning and operational practices for ship operators and Masters of ships transiting the Indian Ocean
BM	Ballistic Missile
CH	Channel
CMF	Combined Maritime Forces: 34 nation multi-national maritime force operating in Indian Ocean, Red Sea, Arabian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, and Gulf of Aden.
CPA	Closest Point of Approach
CTF	Combined Task Force
ECSA	European Community Shipowners' Association
EU NAVFOR	European Union Naval Force Somalia (Operation Atalanta)
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
FO	Focused Operation
FV	Fishing Vessel
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GOA	Gulf of Aden
GOO	Gulf of Oman
GOY	Government of Yemen
HQ	Headquarters
HRA	High Risk Area: Industry defined area where it is considered there is a higher risk of piracy and within which self-protective measures are most likely to be required

IMB	International Maritime Bureau
IMP	Inter Monsoon Period
IMSC	International Maritime Security Construct
IMX	International Maritime Exercise
IAW	In Accordance With
ICOD	Intelligence Cut-off Date
ICS	International Chamber of Shipping
INTERTANKO	International Association of Independent Tank Owners
IRG	Internationally Recognized Government
IRTA	Industry Releasable Threat Assessment
IRTB	Industry Releasable Threat Bulletin
IRTC	Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor
ISCAP	Islamic State Central African Province
IUU	Illegal Unreported and Unregulated
IS	Islamic State
IS-S	Islamic State in Somalia
Kts	Knots
KSA	Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
MSCHOA	Maritime Security Centre (Horn of Africa): The maritime industry control centre for the EU's Op ATALANTA.
MSTC	Maritime Security Transit Corridor
MT	Motor Tanker
MV	Motor Vessel
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NM	Nautical Mile
OCIMF	Oil Companies International Maritime Forum
PAG	Piracy Action Groups (group of pirates formed to capture a vessel)
PCASP	Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel
POB	Persons on Board
Posn.	Position
SABG	Saudi Arabian Border Guards
SHADE	Shared Awareness and De-confliction
SLC	Saudi Led Coalition
SRS	Southern Red Sea
STC	Southern Transitional Council

SWM	South West Monsoon
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UKMCC	United Kingdom Maritime Component Command
UKMTO	United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations, based in Dubai
USV	Unmanned Surface Vehicle
VRA	Vessel Registration Area
VRS	Voluntary Reporting Scheme
WBIED	Water Borne Improvised Explosive Device
WFP	World Food Programme